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CONSIDERATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
CONCERNING THE TRANSFERABILITY OF
INDIAN WATER RIGHTS
JACK D. PALMA 11*

As a consequence of the decision of the United States Supreme
Court in Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United
States,1 the race to the courthouse to adjudicate Winters water
rights2 between the states on one hand and the United States and/or
their Indian wards on the other has intensified. There appears to be a
feeling among state and federal officials alike that, once these adjudications run their course, the uncertainty and acrimony surrounding
the assertion of Indian water rights will disappear. However, as tribes
attempt to reap the economic gains that they perceive should flow
from the use of these water rights, there is a second generation of
uncertainty, discord, and litigation looming in the future.
Courts have applied various standards to determine the quantity of
water reserved under the Winters doctrine.' Regardless of what test

is utilized to quantify these Indian water rights, the tribes will obtain
prior and, in most cases, paramount rights to vast quantities of
water. 4 The extent to which the quantification of Indian water rights
will lead to harmony or result in discord between states and tribes is
very much dependent upon yet undefined legal limits on the extent
of Indian water rights. It is the purpose of this article to explore the
legal parameters of Indian water rights and to suggest some possible
constraints which should be placed upon the transferability of water
rights to new uses and users, both on and off the reservation.'
*Senior Assistant Attorney General for the State of Wyoming. The views presented herein
do not necessarily represent the views of the State of Wyoming.
1. 424 U.S. 800 (1976) (commonly referred to and hereinafter cited as Akin). This case
affirmed the concurrent jurisdiction of state and federal courts to adjudicate reserved water
rights, including those rights of Indian tribes.
2. The term "Winters rights" is derived from Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564
(1908), in which the United States Supreme Court first declared that, when the United
States set aside lands as Indian reservations, sufficient unappropriated water was implicitly
reserved for Indian use to satisfy the purposes for which the lands were reserved.
3. In Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 601 (1963), for example, the Supreme Court
concluded that "the only feasible and fair way by which reserved water for the reservation
can be measured is irrigable acreage." For an extensive treatment of the issue of the quantity of water reserved, see Sondheim & Alexander, Federal Indian Water Rights: A Retrogression to Quasi-Riparianism?,34 S. CAL L. REV. 1 (1960).
4. See, e.g., Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. at 596, 600, in which the Court decreed a
reservation of about I million acre-feet for use on approximately 135,000 acres of land.
5. This article presumes that quantification of Indian water rights is both desirable and
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LIMITS UPON THE TRANSFERABILITY OF INDIAN WATER RIGHTS
FOR OFF-RESERVATION USES
In this new era of "tribal nationalism," 6 the Winters doctrine has
been fashioned into an economic doctrine, designed to assist the
tribes in achieving greater financial, and hence political, autonomy as
sovereign nations. Basic to the concept of the Winters doctrine as an
economic doctrine is the assumption that the tribes can market their
water rights to non-Indians for a variety of uses, both on and off the
reservation.' A careful reading of Winters v. United States9 and its
progeny is necessary to determine whether in fact this view is firmly
based in the law of Indian water rights.
The question before the United States Supreme Court in the
Winters case was whether diversions of water from the Milk River by
non-Indian appropriators located upstream from the Ft. Belknap
Indian Reservation in Montana should be enjoined. The appropriators claimed a priority date of 1898, which they asserted was prior
to use of the river by either the tribes or the United States. On the
other hand, the United States contended that if the tribes "are deprived of the waters their lands cannot be successfully cultivated, and
they will become useless and homes cannot be maintained thereon." 1 0
In deciding the case, the Court looked to the intent of the 1898
treaty between the United States and the tribes, noting that:
The reservation was a part of a very much larger tract which the
Indians had the right to occupy and use, and which was adequate for
the habits and wants of a nomadic and uncivilized people. It was the
policy of the Government, it was the desire of the Indians, to change
those habits and to become a pastoral and civilized people. If they
should become such, the original tract was too extensive; but a
smaller tract would be inadequate without a change in conditions.
necessary, a presumption which is not shared by all of my colleagues on either the state,
federal, or tribal side of this issue; see Palma, Indian Water Rights: A State PerspectiveAfter
Akin, 57 NEB. L. REV. 295 (1978).
6. See, e.g., Israel, The Reemergence of Tribal Nationalism and Its Impact on Reserva-

tion Resource Development, 47 U. COLO. L. REV. 617 (1976).

7. See, e.g., Dellwo, Indian Water Rights-The Winters Doctrine Updated, 6 GONZ. L
REV. 215 (1971); Pelcyger, Winters Doctrine and the Greening of the Reservations, 4 J.
CONTEMP. L. 19 (1977); Veeder, Water Rights in the Coal Fields of the Yellowstone River
Basin, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 77 (1976).
8. The potential wealth available by marketing water rights is evidenced by the fact that

industrial water users within the mineral-rich Yellowstone River Basin have expressed a
willingness to pay up to $100 per consumptive acre foot of water.
9. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).

10. Id at 569.
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The lands were arid, and, without irrigation, were practically valueless. 1

The essence of the Court's reasoning, which lies at the very heart of
the Winters doctrine, was that a reservation of water was necessary in
order to ensure that the lands reserved for Indians would support
agricultural use and a civilized lifestyle.1 2 In other words, the purpose of creating the Ft. Belknap reservation was to provide a permanent homeland for Indians. Therefore, it was necessary to assure that
sufficient water was available to meet that purpose. A similar rationale was applied in United States v. Powers,I 3 in which the Supreme
Court found the existence of an implied reservation of water sufficient for the settlement and cultivation of lands within the boundaries of the Crow Indian Reservation.
More recently, in Arizona v. California,I' the Supreme Court
again dealt with the question of the purpose of the implied reservation of water under the Winters doctrine. In this landmark decision,
the claims of five Indian reservations located along the mainstem of
the Colorado River were at issue.' I Arizona attacked the claims for
water asserted by the tribes and also challenged a special master's
determination of the quantities of water which were reserved for the
tribes. In its decision, the Supreme Court reviewed the history surrounding the creation of the five reservations and found evidence
indicating a legislative intent to establish irrigated agriculture on the
reservations. Consequently, the Court rejected the argument that the
United States had created the Indian reservations without intending
to reserve waters necessary to make the reservations productive for
agriculture.' 6
The lesson from these Supreme Court decisions is that the transferability of Winters water rights to off-reservation uses is limited for
two reasons. First, Winters rights were created as an adjunct to land
and have no existence apart from that land. Second, Winters rights
were intended to have only a limited purpose. 1 7 Thus, where the
11. Id at 576.
12. Id
13. United States v. Powers, 305 U.S. 527, 533 (1938). A brief synopsis of this case
appears below.
14. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
15. These reservations were Chemehuevi, Cocopah, Yuma, Colorado River and Fort
Mohave.

16. 373 U.S. at 600.
17. The view that Winters rights may be confined to use on the reservation to which they
are appurtenant was shared in an unpublished letter from the Solicitor's Office, Department
of Interior, to the Office of the California Attorney General, dated September 16, 1970,
which addressed the proposed sale of water by the Chemehuevi Indian Tribe to the Havasu
Water Company.
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tribes found sustenance from agriculture, irrigation water was
reserved; 1 where fishing was important, fishing rights formed the
basis of the Winters right.1 It is arguable that an Indian reservation
in a water-abundant region could be limited to stock and domestic
water.
Indian reserved water rights were never intended to serve any function other than adding to the productivity of the reservation. Crops,
wildlife, and the inhabitants of the reservation needed water to survive on the desolate and God-forsaken land upon which the government confined our Native Americans. There is no indication in
treaties, executive orders, legislative history, or the holdings of our
highest Court that the United States intended to reserve excessive
amounts of water so that tribes could market all that was not needed
for their own use on the reservation. In fact, surplus water is beyond
the scope and extent of the reserved right, which is limited to that
minimum quantity of water necessary to satisfy the purposes for
which the reservation was created;2 0 any water in the stream beyond
the needs of the tribe should be available for other water users.2 1
Some commentators suggest that there is no logic or equity to
such limitations upon the transferability of Indian water rights-that
Winters rights should be limited only by the "no injury rule" applicable to appropriative rights under. western water law.2 2 I submit
that this broad view is, in fact, illogical. Indian water rights share
virtually none of the important attributes of appropriative rights,
aside from the fact that both forms of water rights enjoy a priority
date which determines the priority of right to the use of water. As a
consequence, it appears inconsistent to argue that Winters rights
must possess a transferability equal to that permitted under the prior
appropriation doctrine of water law.
A more appropriate comparison exists between the Winters doctrine and the riparian system of water law. Unlike the rights of
western appropriators which are based upon actual diversion and use
18. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963); United States v. Powers, 305 U.S. 527
(1939); Winters v. United States, 307 U.S. 564 (1908).
19. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905); Alaska Pac. Fisheries v. United States,
248 U.S. 78 (1918).
20. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 141 (1976).
21. United States v. Hibner, 27 F.2d 909 (D. Idaho 1928).
22. Veeder, Water Rights in the Coal Fields of the Yellowstone River Basin, 40 LAW
AND CONTEMP. PROB. 77, 89 (1976). Under the appropriation doctrine a water right may
be transferred to a new use where it can be shown that there will be no injury to other
vested water rights. See, e.g., Green v. Chaffee Ditch Co., 371 P.2d 775, 783 (Colo. 1962).
However, the "no injury" rule presupposes that there has been beneficial consumptive use
of the water right sought to be transferred. Since most Winters rights have not been historically exercised, the tribes would appear unwise to place reliance upon the "no injury" rule.
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of water,2 ' both riparian and Winters water rights exist as a result of
ownership of land. 2 4 As a consequence of the appurtenancy of these
rights, neither riparian nor reserved water rights can be lost through
non-use.2 ' Riparian rights are confined to use upon the lands to
which they are appurtenant, thus precluding the use by the riparian
owner, or sale to another for use, off the lands to which the water is
appurtenant. 2 6 The logic behind this prohibition is that each riparian
owner is entitled only to the reasonable use of water, taking into
account the needs of other riparian users.2 7 The law refused to allow
one riparian owner to monopolize the stream to the exclusion of the
needs and uses of others, a rationale which is equally applicable as it
relates to the effect of Indian water uses upon other users of the
stream.
Indian water rights benefit from a priority date at least equal to
the date of the creation of the reservation. 2 1 That priority exists
whether or not the tribes have historically exercised such rights, 2 I a
principle foreign to the appropriation doctrine and not widely understood by western appropriators who operate under a system which
grants priority in the use of water to those who made early application of water to beneficial use.
The result has been apprehension in the western public land states
that the [Winters] doctrine will have the effect of disrupting established water right priority systems and destroying, without compensation, water rights considered to have vested under state law. Moreover, the uncertainty generated by the doctrine is an impediment to
sound coordinated planning for future water resources development. 3 o
The transfer of Indian water rights for off-reservation uses can
only heighten the apprehension within western states, since it will
greatly increase the prospect that large quantities of water will be
consumptively used by Indian water right holders to the exclusion of
23. See, e.g., Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443 (1882); Lux v. Haggin, 10 P.
674 (Cal. 1886).
24. See, e.g., Illinois C.R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892); United States v. Hibner,
27 F.2d 909 (D. Idaho 1928).
25. Id.; Hargrave v. Cook, 41 P. 18 (Cal. 1895). Under the common law, and by statute
in some states, appropriative rights may be subject to abandonment or forfeiture for nonuse. See, e.g., 2 KINNEY, IRRIGATION AND WATER RIGHTS § 1118 (2d ed. 1912);
WYO. STAT. §41-3-401 (1977).
26. 7 R. CLARK, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, §614.1 (1976).
27. Id. §516.2.
28. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
29. United States v. Hibner, 27 F.2d 909 (D. Idaho 1928).
30. PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S
LANDS 144 (1970).
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vested appropriators. Such exploitation of these Indian water rights
by sale or lease to others for use off the reservation would surely
have a devastating effect upon the non-Indian economy. In balancing
the equity of limiting Indian water rights to the original intent
against the harsh impact of off-reservation use upon non-Indian
water users, one finds support for a restrictive view of Winters rights.
While the United States Supreme Court has rejected a "balancing
of the equities" approach respecting the creation of reserved
rights,3 1 there is support for the proposition that equitable considerations should limit the scope of reserved rights.3 2 Those considerations necessarily weigh against permitting the disruption of
existing agricultural economies throughout the West by allowing the
wholesale peddling of Winters water rights for use outside the boundaries of the reservation.
TRANSFERABILITY WITHIN THE BOUNDARIES OF THE RESERVATION

A different situation presents itself with respect to the transferability of Indian water rights to new uses within the boundaries of the
Indian reservation for two reasons. First, the transfer of water to new
uses within the reservation is consistent with the purpose for which
the water was reserved in the first instance. Moreover, the transfer of
water to new uses within the reservation would not cause nearly the
impact which would accompany the sale of water off the reservation
to meet the virtually limitless demand for water in the West.
While the Winters right may be measured by the practicably
irrigable acreage on the reservation, 3 3 courts have consistently recognized that the scope of the right must be flexible enough to meet
future, as well as present, needs of the reservation. 3 4 Tribal advocates translate the "present and future needs" language to mean that
the Winters right is open-ended, allowing additional water to be
claimed as new uses for the water on the reservation arise. s
A more workable approach would be to limit the quantity of
31. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
32. Myers, Federal GroundwaterRights: A Note on Cappaertv. United States, 13 LAND
& WATER L. REV. 377, 387-88 (1978).
33. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
34. See, e.g., Conrad Investment Co. v. United States, 161 F. 829 (9th Cir. 1908); United
States v. Ahtanum Irr. Dist., 236 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 988
(1957), second appeal 330 F.2d 897 (9th Cit. 1964); see also S. Rifkind, Report of the
Special Master 265, 266 (1960) (Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963)) [hereinafter
cited as Report of the Special Master].
35. Dellwo, Indian Water Rights-The Winters Doctrine Updated, 6 GONZ. L. REV. 215
(1971); Veeder, Winters Doctrine Rights-Keystone of National Programsfor Western Land
and Water Conservationand Utilization, 26 MONT. L. REV. 149 (1965).
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water reserved to that necessary for the purpose of the reservation3 6,
while allowing the use of the water to shift to meet present-day
needs on the reservation. This approach would provide the certainty
sought by non-Indians regarding the quantity of water reserved under
the Winters right and further would provide for the ever-changing
requirements for water on the reservation. 7
Since most of the water claimed under the Winters doctrine has
not yet been put to beneficial use, there is a question about the
quantity of water which could be transferred to a new use. Many
scholars suggest the "no injury" rule as a basis for limiting the
amount of water right that can be transferred.3 8 However, reliance
on that principle would be ill placed, since it would severely restrict
the flexibility of Winters rights. 9
A similar but more reasonable approach would be to calculate the
beneficial consumptive use attributable to the initial purpose of the
40
reservation and then to allow that amount to shift to other uses.
This process is no more difficult than the chore faced in quantifying
reserved rights in the first instance where little or no actual use of
water has occurred on the reservation. The principal advantage of
allowing the change in use of Indian water rights is that it eliminates
the need for tribes to make repeated claims for additional water as
new uses arise. This view, of course, also assumes that there is a limit
to the quantity of water reserved for the reservation,
a view which is
4
opposed by advocates of open-ended Winters rights.

1

36. The bulk of the decisions respecting Indian water rights have related the reservation
of water to agricultural purposes. See, e.g., Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963);
United States v. Powers, 305 U.S. 527 (1939); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564
(1908); United States v. Walker River Irr. Dist., 104 F2d 334 (9th Cir. 1939); Skeem v.
United States, 273 F. 93 (9th Cir. 1921); United States v. Hibner, 27 F.2d 909 (D. Idaho
1928); Anderson v. Spear-Morgan Livestock Co., 107 Mont. 18, 79 P.2d 667 (1938); Merrill
v. Bishop, 69 Wyo. 45, 237 P.2d 186 (1951).
37. Such an approach also squares with the holding in UnitedStates v. NewMexico, 438
U.S. 696 (1978), in which the Court refused to recognize reserved right claims of the United
States for "secondary uses" beyond the purposes for which the Gila National Forest had
been created. By analogy, no water can be claimed for modern-day uses of water which were
virtually non-existent at the time of creation of most Indian reservations and, therefore,
beyond the scope of the implied reservation of water.
38. See note 22 supra.
39. Since the Winters doctrine is designed to take the tribes out of competition with
appropriators in order to secure their right to the use of water on the reservation, a limitation on the transferability of Winters rights based upon the amount of water historically put
to use would run counter to one of the principal objectives and benefits of the doctrine.
40. This approach has been suggested by the states of Arizona, California, and Nevada in
connection with their joint motion to the United States Supreme Court for determination
of present perfected rights and the entry of a supplemental decree under the terms of
Article VI of the Court's decree in Arizona v. California,373 U.S. 546 (1963).
41. See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
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THE LAW WITH RESPECT TO ALLOTMENTS
An additional issue concerning the transferability of Winters rights
involves the rights of purchasers of land which was formerly a part of
the reservation. The private ownership of lands within the exterior
boundaries of Indian reservations is common, brought about by the
goal of assimilation which dominated federal Indian policy in the
early 1900s. After the cessation of hostilities between white settlers
and Indians, the government embarked upon a program designed to
bring the Indian into the mainstream of society. A key element of
the federal policy was to divide reservation lands into individual
tracts for each Indian 4 2 and to make available the unallotted land
43
within the reservation to non-Indians for homesteading purposes.
As a consequence of this fee ownership of tracts located within a
reservation, several lawsuits have originated over claims to Winters
water rights made by successors in interest to such land.4 4 The
earliest of these allotment cases, United States v. Hibner,4 s determined the rights of non-Indian purchasers of allotted land involving
the Fort Hall Indian Reservation in Idaho. In its decision, the court
first addressed the rights of the Indian allottees, holding that they
were entitled to reserved rights with a priority date equal to the
ratification date of the Fort Bridger Treaty which established the
reservation, and that these rights could not be abandoned or forfeited for non-use. 6
The court also recognized the right of allottees to sell their land
and water. The purchasers of such water rights were granted the right
to the Winters priority date but were held to -be immediately
governed by state law. Further, purchasers were limited to the
amount of water which had been actually used by the Indian
allottee, along with that which could be put to use with reasonable
diligence.
The next case to address the allotment issue was United States v.
Powers,4 1 in which the rights of non-Indian purchasers of allotments
which had formerly been a part of the Crow Reservation in Montana
were at issue. The United States sought to enjoin the non-Indian
holders of the allotments from using waters above a government
irrigation project on the reservation.
42. See, e.g., General Allotment Act of 1887, 25 U.S.C. §331 (1976) (commonly referred to as the Dawes Act).
43. See, e.g., § §43 U.S.C. 161-302 (1976).
44. It appears that the lessees of allotted lands may exercise the water rights appurtenant
to such lands, Skeem v. United States, 273 F. 93, 96 (9th Cir. 1921), and that issue will not
be treated herein. See also Report of Special Master 266.
45. 27 F.2d 909 (D. Idaho 1928).
46. Id at 912

47. 305 U.S. 527 (1939).
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In denying the government's request for an injunction, the
Supreme Court observed: "[W]hen allotments of land were duly
made for exclusive use and thereafter conveyed in fee, the right to
use some portion of tribal waters essential for cultivation passed to
the owners." 4"8 Unfortunately, however, the Powers case was decided on procedural grounds, and the Court did not have the opportunity to shed any additional light upon the extent of the nonIndians' rights to the use of water upon the former allotment.
Recently, the law with respect to the rights of transferees of
allotted land has become unsettled as a result of the decision in
Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton.' I There, the tribes sought to
enjoin the use of water by Walton, a non-Indian successor in interest
to an allotment within the boundaries of the reservation.
The evidence in the case revealed that the original allottee had not
irrigated the land, although he later sold it to another Indian who
irrigated 32 acres before selling the land to Walton. Walton claimed a
reserved right for the entire allotment or, in the alternative, for the
32 irrigated acres of land, on the theory that the reserved water right
is appurtenant to the land and thus passes to non-Indian landowners.
The state of Washington intervened in order to protect its authority
to issue state water rights permits within the boundaries of the reservation and aligned itself with Walton.
The United States and the tribes took contrary positions on the
question of alienability of the reserved water right. The federal government argued that Walton obtained a right to the amount of water
being put to use at the time of the transfer, while the tribes contended that the reserved right was a tribal right, which could not be
alienated to a non-Indian.
Unpersuaded by the contentions of the parties or by the previous
holdings in United States v. Hibner and United States v. Powers, the
court broke new ground. Although the court agreed that reserved
rights are appurtenant to allotted land," ° it found that reserved
water rights exist for the sole purpose of providing necessary water
to ensure that the reservation can provide a permanent homeland for
the tribes. Consequently, "[w]hen title to Indian lands passes into
non-Indian hands, the purposes for which the reserved water rights
are implied no longer exist. It therefore seems logical to conclude
that reserved water rights on Indian reservations are limited to Indians."' 1
48. Id. at 532.
49. 460 F. Supp. 1320 (E.D. Wash. 1978).
50. Id. at 1326.
51. Id. at 1328; see also United States v. Anderson, No. 3643 (E. D. Wash. July 23,
1979), in which the court held that the original purposes of the reservation cease to exist
when the land passes out of Indian ownership.
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Based upon that reasoning, the court denied Walton his reserved
right, but granted him a right to irrigate 32 acres, with a priority date
equal to the date that the water had first been put to use. Finally,
the court held that, when an allotment is transferred to non-Indian
ownership, the purpose for the implied reservation of water is defeated, and that portion of the Winters water right does not inure to
the benefit of the tribe, but is lost completely.
The Walton decision cannot be said to represent a clear-cut victory
to any of the principals in the case,' 2 and its precedential value is
limited by its curious reversal of prior decisions which hold that
Indian water rights are appurtenant to the land within the Indian
reservation."3 Apparently, the court was heavily influenced by its
conclusion that the reserved right is a personal right created solely
for the use of the tribes,' 4 a conclusion which the court reached
after analyzing the rationale behind the Winters doctrine.' s This
element of the Walton decision transcends the facts of the case, for it
isolates the real significance of a Winters water right-that it is
created for and limited to the purpose of satisfying water needs
within the boundaries of the reservation.

CONCLUSION
Only when the Winters doctrine is advanced as an economic doctrine does it reach the boundless proportions suggested by its
staunchest dogmatists. However, it is clear that the Winters doctrine
was designed for the limited purpose of meeting the needs of Indian
reservations. While the doctrine arose to assure that Indians residing
on the reservation would be able to enjoy a quality of life equivalent
to that found in the non-Indian agrarian community, there is no
foundation in law or equity to support the transferability of Winters
water rights for use outside the boundaries of Indian reservations.
52. While Washington State took the position that the reserved right passed with the
land, it probably is quite content with the decision of the court limiting the scope of
reserved rights and thus reducing the likelihood that a previously unasserted paramount
claim to water could, without notice, spring up and upset the rights of water users under
state law. Additionally, the case established the right of the state to exercise its sovereign
authority to regulate the appropriation and administration of non-reserved waters within the
exterior boundaries of the reservation.
53. Recently, for example, the court in United States and Kalamath Indian Tribes v.
Adair and the State of Oregon, Civil No. 75-914 (D. Ore. Sep. 27, 1979), explicitly rejected
the holding in Walton in favor of the principles of law set forth in Hibner respecting the
water rights of non-Indian successors to Indian allotments.
54. 460 F. Supp. at 1328.
55. Id.

